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Truman Bewley has argued that there are two key features constraining wage cuts for
new hires in recessions (Bewley (1999a)). Because wage cuts for incumbents will have
a negative impact on morale, ￿rms avoid them under all but extreme circumstance; at
the same time while new hires may be willing to work at a lower wage than that paid to
incumbents, paying them less would disrupt internal equity and so their wages will be set
at the same level as incumbents￿ :
New employees, in contrast, feel it is inequitable to be paid according to a
scale lower than the one that applied to colleagues that were hired earlier. For
this reason, downward pay rigidity for new hires exists only because the pay
of existing employees is rigid. (Bewley (1999b))
Bewley￿ s account mainly concentrates on the question of why ￿rms do not cut wages
in recession. But it raises the important question of how forward looking ￿rms take
into account the fact that such constraints￿ downward rigidity combined with ￿equal
treatment￿ of new hires￿ may arise in the future. For example, a ￿rm, anticipating
downward wage rigidity, may temper wage increases in better times. Or in more generality,
and supposing that ￿rms can o⁄er long-term contracts, the ￿rm must take into account
these equal treatment constraints which will prevent it bringing in new hires at a low
wage in downturns, and also prevent the ￿rm hiring at a higher wage than that o⁄ered to
incumbents when the labour market is tight.1 What are the implications for wages and
employment in an equilibrium model with forward looking ￿rms and workers?
We analyse a model in which the pay of new hires and existing workers is linked￿
indeed we assume is identical, given that all workers are perfect substitutes￿ and in which
the pay of incumbents is subject to some downward rigidity. This rigidity is then trans-
mitted to the pay of new hires. We stress the point that for there to be signi￿cant labour
market implications it is necessary that downward rigidity applies to new hires￿ if it only
applies to incumbent workers so that new hires can be hired at a ￿ exible wage, there
is no reason why hiring decisions should not be e¢ cient. Workers and ￿rms then must
anticipate the e⁄ects of this, so that for example an increase in current wages means that
future wages cannot be cut below this level. Despite the enormous literature which exists
1Bringing in workers at higher pay than incumbents is even more problematic; thus while￿ in contrast to
the primary sector￿ Bewley found evidence that new hires are sometimes paid a lower rate than incumbents
in the secondary sector, even there, paying new hires more than incumbents is deemed to be very disruptive
(Bewley (1999a, p. 320)).
1on downward rigidities, there has been almost no analysis of the forward looking nature
of the decision problem and its labor market implications (see Elsby (2005) for a solution
of a problem involving downward nominal rigidities, but in a very di⁄erent context).
The paper extends the equal treatment model of Snell and Thomas (2006), by adding
a possible explicit ad hoc downward rigidity constraint, and by extending the model to
multiple sectors, an extension which is crucial to addressing recent empirical evidence. In
the unrestricted model￿ without downward rigidity￿ ￿rms have to trade-o⁄ the desire to
insure their risk-averse workers against the need to respond to market conditions to not
only prevent their workers from quitting but, because of equal treatment of workers, also
to take advantage of states of the world where labour is cheap. The insurance motive
alone provides a degree of downward rigidity. We then add to this model downward wage
restrictions in the spirit of Bewley to see how the performance of the model changes. A
￿rm will face not only a sequence of participation constraints if it needs to hire in new
workers, but also a constraint each period restricting the degree to which it can cut its
wage. A major challenge of the analysis is to solve for an equilibrium in the face of these
constraints
We argue that our model, when simulated with sectoral productivity shocks, is capable
of generating empirical results that are reasonably consistent with unemployment and
wage movements over the business cycle. However we ￿nd that in a number of dimensions
adding either real or nominal rigidity constraints to the basic risk-sharing model improves
its performance.
The equal treatment assumption prevents ￿rms from cutting wages for new entrants,
so that in periods with adverse shocks the wage may not fall su¢ ciently to clear the labour
market. In the absence of equal treatment, wage rigidity in this model (with ￿xed hours)
would not have employment e⁄ects, as utilities o⁄ered to new entrants would be ￿ exible.
We show however that (under certain conditions) ￿rms hire up to the point where the
real wage equals the marginal product of labour; to the extent then that wages do not
correspond to market-clearing levels hiring will be ine¢ cient; in fact we show that this
occurs only in the direction of wages being too high leading to ine¢ ciently low employment
and an excess supply of labour.
There is little direct empirical evidence on the issue of equal treatment. The principal
exception is a study of pay discrimination by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), who
examined the pay of managerial employees in a single ￿rm over time. They found that
incumbents￿pay tends to move together, but the pay of entrants is signi￿cantly more
variable, suggesting that the pay of new hires may be more subject to outside conditions
2than that of incumbents. Wachter and Bender (2007) have recently run a similar analysis
on a number of ￿rms in a large German manufacturing sector, and they, too, ￿nd evidence
of substantial and quite persistent entry cohort e⁄ects. However these seem to be widely
distributed across ￿rms at any given date, suggesting, as they note, that they are not driven
by cyclical phenomena. Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2007) construct a representative
series for US wages of new hires (based on the CPS); in their de￿nition new hires consist
of workers who were without work in the previous 4 months, and consequently includes
those hired from the pool of unemployed along with workers entering from outside of the
labor market. They argue that this series shows substantially more variability than the
comparable one for those who remain in work, and indeed varies roughly one-for-one with
productivity, in line with the basic matching model.2 We do not regard this as fatal for
our assumption however: a higher aggregate variability across sectors of new hire wages
relative to incumbents does not necessarily imply the same is true within each sector. We
hope to develop the model to address this issue in the future. Finally, as discussed above,
survey evidence in Bewley (1999a) suggests that violations of equal treatment are unusual,
particularly in the primary sector. Similar ￿ndings exist for other countries: ￿Managers
responded that hiring underbidders would violate their internal wage policy￿(Agell and
Lundborg (1999, p.7), based on a Swedish survey); in a British survey, Kaufman (1984)
reported that almost all managers viewed bringing in similarly quali￿ed workers at lower
wage rates as ￿infeasible.￿Akerlof and Yellen (1990) argue that personnel management
texts treat the need for equitable pay as virtually self-evident.
2This issue has arisen in the debate since Shimer (2005a) about whether the Mortensen-Pissarides
matching model is capable of generating su¢ cient variability of the vacancies to unemployment ratio from
plausibly sized productivity variations. One answer to this has been to posit that real wages do not vary as
much as the Nash bargaining approach implies, thus giving rise to increased cyclical e⁄ects (Hall 2005a).
While this gives a satisfactory theoretical resolution of the di¢ culty, Pissarides (2007) points out one can
look at the empirical studies to see which story about wages looks more reasonable. In fact, the model
doesn￿ t deal directly in terms of the unemployment elasticities which have been estimated (see below for a
discussion of these), but rather generates an elasticity of wages with respect to productivity of around unity.
However the empirical unemployment elasticity can be combined with an Okun￿ s Law style relationship
between hourly productivity and unemployment, to give an estimated productivity elasticity also around
unity, or greater, depending on the estimation period. Thus this would suggest as much or even a greater
degree of wage cyclicality in the data than in the traditional model with Nash bargaining. His conclusion
is therefore that the resolution of positing more rigid wages leads to an empirically implausible degree
of wage rigidity, and one should look elsewhere to resolve this question. Pissarides also points out that
it is the estimated wage elasticity for new matches that should be used in the above exercise, since it is
these wages which determine the pro￿tability of a new match and hence drive job creation. What happens
to wages for old matches is of secondary importance, and it is possible to modify the existing model to
generate a model which is broadly consistent with what we know about them.
32 The model
The model is as follows. Time runs from t = 1;2;3:::T, where T ￿ 2 is ￿nite, and there
is a single consumption good each period (all wages below are real wages). There are M
equal sized sectors. All workers are assumed to be identical, except for the date at which
they enter the labor market, and the sector to which they are currently associated (we
abstract from any tenure or experience e⁄ects on productivity). Workers are risk averse
with per period twice di⁄erentiable utility function u(w); u0 > 0;u00 < 0; where w ￿ 0 is
the income which must be consumed within the period; it is assumed that they can neither
save nor borrow. There is no disutility of work, but hours are ￿xed so that workers are
either employed or unemployed. Assume that if workers are not employed in a period,
they receive some low consumption level c > 0: There is a large (but ￿xed) number of
identical risk-neutral ￿rms in each sector. A ￿rm in sector m has a diminishing returns
technology where output is Fm(N;st) with @Fm=@N > 0;@2Fm=@N2 < 0; where N
is labour input and st is the current shock (which speci￿es current productivity in each
sector). It is assumed that a ￿rm must always employ some (minimum measure of) workers
each period.3 Workers and ￿rms discount the future with common factor ￿ 2 (0;1].
For an employed worker, there is a ￿staying￿probability of ￿ 2 (0;1); each period,
with workers exogenously separating with probability 1 ￿ ￿; moreover with probability
￿ separated workers must seek work at a di⁄erent ￿rm and with probability 1 ￿ ￿ they
die (exit the market); of the surviving separated, a proportion ￿ remain in the same
sector while (1 ￿ ￿) are distributed evenly across sectors. The same death probability of
(1￿￿)(1￿￿) applies to the unemployed, and likewise (1￿￿) of the surviving unemployed
move to other sectors. Separation occurs at the end of a period so that separated workers
who do not die but ￿nd a job in the following period do not su⁄er any unemployment.
The number dying is replaced by the same number of new entrants, so that each sector
maintains its size. (Thus all movements between ￿rms and between sectors are due to
exogenous separations and workers cannot choose, for example, which sector to move to,
or enter.) We assume there are a large number of workers relative to the number of ￿rms,
and we normalize the ratio of workers to ￿rms to be one in each sector and each period.4
We assume that the ￿spot wage￿ /full employment solution (N = 1) is always greater than
the unemployment consumption level, i.e., that @Fm=@N(1;st) > c all t:
3This can be motivated by an assumption that ￿rms cannot produce after a period of zero production.
4While these di⁄erent probabilities make the model rather involved, it turns out that under certain
conditions they do not matter for the equilibrium wage paths when downward rigidity is imposed. This
would not be true if workers were able to choose which sectors to enter, an extension we plan to make in
the future.
4The shock st follows a stochastic process, with initial value s1; which we specify in
more detail below. Let ht ￿ (s1;s2;:::;st) be the history at t. The labour market o⁄ers
a worker currently looking for work in sector m (at the start of t, discounted to t) of
￿m
t = ￿m
t (ht): this is an average of the utility from remaining unemployed and that from
from getting a job where the weight depends on the probability of being hired as described
below. A ￿rm must o⁄er at least ￿m
t (ht) to prevent its workers from quitting, and this is
also the minimum utility that must be o⁄ered to hire: We assume that the ￿rm can hire
any number of workers by o⁄ering at least ￿m
t (and cannot hire otherwise). So the labour
market is modelled as being competitive.
We summarise the timing is as follows. At date 1 each ￿rm in sector m o⁄ers a single
state-contingent wage contract (wm
t (ht))
T
t=1 to which it is committed. Workers then can
accept contracts and period 1 production takes place. At the end of period 1; a ￿rm loses
a fraction (1￿￿) of its workforce due to exogenous separation, as described above. At the
start of each subsequent period t ￿ 2; ￿rms and workers observe st. Workers may quit
costlessly at this point and join the pool of those previously separated and new entrants
to the sector, facing the same probability of employment (so receive ￿m
t (ht)), but may
not switch sectors. However, provided the continuation utility o⁄ered by the contract at
least matches ￿t; the ￿rm is able to retain its sta⁄ and hire in as many new workers as it
requires from the pool of those previously separated. Production takes place and wages
wm
t (ht) are paid, and so on.
2.1 The Firm￿ s problem
We work with a representative ￿rm in sector m. At the start of date 1; after s1 is observed,
as just stated, ￿rms in each sector m commit to contracts (wm
t (ht))
T
t=1, wm
t (ht) ￿ 0,
which we assume are not binding on workers. We assume equal treatment: a worker
joining subsequently, at ￿ after history h￿, is o⁄ered a continuation of this same contract:
(wm
t (ht))
T
t=￿. (This is to be contrasted with the case where discrimination is permitted
where a worker joining at ￿ would be o⁄ered a contract which in principle may be unrelated
to that o⁄ered to previous cohorts.) To avoid cluttering the notation, we omit sector
superscripts in what follows unless necessary (so an omitted superscript implies that the
sector is m). Let Vt (ht) denote the continuation utility from t onwards from the contract,
de￿ned recursively by:
Vt (ht) = u(wt(ht)) + ￿w[E￿Vt+1 (ht+1) + (1)
(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿￿t+1 +
X
m06=m
(M ￿ 1)￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿m0
t+1 j ht];
5with VT+1 = 0, where E denotes expectation, and the terms involving ￿t+1 and ￿m0
t+1
re￿ ect the utility after exogenous separation but no death. Each ￿rm also has a planned
employment path (Nt(ht))
T
t=1, where Nt (ht) ￿ 0:
Our aim is to construct an equilibrium in which layo⁄s do not occur, largely because it
substantially simpli￿es the analytics of the solution. In fact, we will state the optimization
problem imposing no layo⁄s, to avoid complicating the statement of the problem, and
later derive parameter restrictions for which this remains a solution even if layo⁄s are
permitted.5
The problem faced by the ￿rm, which takes (￿t)
T
t=1 as parametric, is:
max
(wt(ht))T
t=1;(Nt(ht))T
t=1
E
"
T X
t=1
(￿f)t￿1 (Fm(Nt(ht);st) ￿ Nt(ht)wt(ht))
#
(Problem DWR)
subject to
Vt (ht) ￿ ￿t (ht) (2)
for all positive probability ht;T ￿ t ￿ 1,
wt (ht￿1;s) ￿ b(ht￿1;s)w(ht￿1); (3)
and
Nt(ht￿1;s) ￿ ￿Nt￿1(ht￿1) (4)
for all positive probability ht￿1; all s 2 S with ￿st￿1s > 0; T ￿ t ￿ 2: (2) is the participation
constraint that says that at any point the contract must o⁄er at least what a worker can
get by quitting, and (3) is the ad hoc downward constraint that imposes that wages cannot
fall at a rate faster than an amount which may depend on the current state (e.g., to capture
in￿ ation), given by b(ht). For b = 1 we have downward real wage rigidity, and for b = 0 we
have the same problem except for omitting the downward constraint on wages. Downward
nominal rigidity would be captured by b(ht) = pt￿1=pt, where pt is the price level at
t. Finally, (4) imposes that the ￿rm may not layo⁄ workers.6 We shall also consider a
modi￿ed version of Problem DWR in which we ignore the constraint (4); we refer to this
as Problem DWR￿ .
5Thus given that the rate of separation is exogenous, movements in unemployment occur through
changes in hiring. This is consistent with the evidence reviewed in Hall (2005b) that argues that the
separation rate is roughly constant (see also Pissarides (1986), Shimer (2005b)), and that although job
losses rise during recessions, the increase is usually very small in relation to the normal levels of separations.
However, these conclusions have been disputed, e.g., Fujita and Ramey (2007), Elsby, Michaels, and Solon
(2007).
6More precisely, (4) implies layo⁄s are not needed. However the de￿nition of Vt(ht) in (1) implies that
a worker remains with the ￿rm unless exogenously separated, so together these two assumptions rule out
layo⁄s.
62.1.1 Equilibrium
We shall use a ￿ superscript to denote equilibrium values. To close the model we impose
an equation specifying the equilibrium determination, given (w￿
t(ht))
T
t=1 ;(N￿
t (ht))
T
t=1 ; of
the outside option in sector m:
￿t =
N￿
t ￿ ￿N￿
t￿1
1 ￿ ￿N￿
t￿1
V ￿
t +
1 ￿ N￿
t
1 ￿ ￿N￿
t￿1
Ut; (5)
N￿
0 = 0, where V ￿
t is the equilibrium contract o⁄er at t (the denominator is the number
of workers not retained after t ￿ 1; which equals the number seeking work at t, while the
numerator in the ￿rst fraction is the number of hires at t). Ut is the discounted utility of
a worker who is unemployed at t which is given by
Ut(ht) = u(c) + ￿w (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))(￿E
￿
￿t+1 j ht
￿
+ (6)
X
m06=m
(M ￿ 1)￿1(1 ￿ ￿)E
h
￿m0
t+1 j ht
i
); (7)
i.e., the utility from the reservation wage plus future utility assuming survival (with prob-
ability (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))) from not having a job at the beginning of t + 1. Given the
endpoint condition ￿m0
T+1 = 0, all m0, (5), (1) and (6) uniquely determine Ut; V ￿
t and ￿t.
Note that there are two cases: if the labour market in sector m at time t clears,
N￿
t (ht) = 1, then from (5) ￿t (ht) must o⁄er the utility o⁄ered by other ￿rms. In symmetric
equilibrium, other ￿rms are o⁄ering an identical contract, and so it is the utility associated
with this, V ￿
t (ht); which must be o⁄ered. If, on the other hand, there is excess supply of
labour,7 N￿
t (ht) < 1, the outside opportunity will depend on the probability of getting a
job.
We can summarise:
De￿nition 1
￿￿
w￿m
t (ht)
￿T
t=1 ;(N￿m
t (ht))
T
t=1
￿M
m=1
constitutes a symmetric (no layo⁄) equi-
librium if it solves Problem DWR for each m where (￿m
t )
T
t=1 is determined recursively from
(1), (5) and (6).
To proceed, we shall provisionally assume that ￿rms always hire (at all ht) in equi-
librium. That is to say, we proceed on the supposition that the constraint (4) in problem
DWR never binds in the solution. We characterize the solution if this is the case, and later
7Intuitively, the case of excess demand for labour cannot arise in equilibrium, as an in￿nitessimally
small increase in the wage would cure the individual ￿rm￿ s supply problem. In contrast, because of equal
treatment the case of excess supply can arise since workers cannot undercut.
7￿nd conditions on a speci￿c parametrization for which the solution satis￿es this property.
Finally we verify that this is also a solution to the original problem.
Then employment is determined by a standard marginal productivity equation (again
suppressing sector superscripts):
Lemma 2 If in a symmetric equilibrium hiring takes place at every ht; then N￿
t (ht) sat-
is￿es
@F(N￿
t (ht);st)=@N = w￿
t(ht): (8)
Proof. Suppose that @F(N￿
t (ht);st)=@N > w￿
t(ht): It is feasible to increase current
hiring holding the wage contract constant, and consider this as the only change to the
￿rm￿ s plan: An increase in current hiring by ￿ > 0, for ￿ small enough, and holding the
wage constant at w￿
t(ht), would lead to an increase in current pro￿ts. At the same time,
holding employment at t+1 constant at N￿
t+1(ht+1) in all states (so hiring falls by ￿￿), is
feasible for ￿ small enough given hiring is positive at t + 1. Thus there is an increase in
pro￿ts at t; and no change at other dates, contradicting pro￿t maximization. A symmetric
argument, using the fact that current hiring is positive so current hiring can be reduced
by ￿; and that t + 1 employment can be increased by ￿￿, rules out @F(N￿
t (ht);st)=@N
< w￿
t(ht):
Suppose that at some t; the participation constraint binds. Then there must be full
employment and the wage is determined by marginal productivity at full employment:
Lemma 3 Consider a symmetric equilibrium in which hiring always occurs; then the par-
ticipation constraint binds at ht if and only if N￿
t (ht) = 1; moreover if the constraint binds
then w￿
t(ht) = @F(1;st)=@N:
Proof. Suppose that N￿
t (ht) < 1: Under the hiring hypothesis, we know from Lemma
2 that @F(N￿
t (ht);st)=@N = w￿
t(ht) > c by the assumption on c and diminishing marginal
productivity (i.e., w￿
t(ht) ￿ c would imply N￿
t (ht) > 1). So a worker who fails to get a job
is strictly worse o⁄, and thus V ￿
t (ht) > ￿(st) (cf. (5) and (6)) and so the participation
constraint does not bind. On the other hand, if N￿
t (ht) = 1 then from (5), V ￿
t (ht) = ￿(st)
and the constraint binds. The equilibrium wage follows directly from Lemma 2.
We de￿ne w￿m
s = @Fm(1;s)=@N; which in view of the above lemma is the equilibrium
wage when the participation constraint binds in state s, but it would also be the wage in
a spot version of the model.
8The above is very useful as it tells us that if the contract wage is below the spot wage
for that state, we get employment above unity, which is infeasible. So this case cannot
occur. If wages are above the spot wage, there is unemployment, and so the participation
constraint cannot bind￿ intuitively a worker who quits is bound to get less utility than
she would by not quitting because of the unemployment possibility.
To proceed to an explicit solution, and in order to facilitate the empirical analysis, we
put more structure on the problem.8 This will allow us to assert that the wage updating
rule in any sector m is of the following simple form: given w￿
t compute wt+1 under the
hypothesis that the participation constraint at t + 1 is not binding; if wt+1 > w￿
st+1 then
the hypothesis is con￿rmed and wt+1 is the equilibrium wage; otherwise the constraint is
binding and the equilibrium wage will be at w￿
st+1. The structure will also allow us to
demonstrate su¢ cient conditions for the symmetric hiring equilibrium to exist.
From henceforth assume each ￿rm has technology given by, at time t,
F(N;st) = Mt + a
(m)
t N1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿); (9)
where ￿ 6= 1, Mt ￿ 0 and for ￿ = 1, we specify F(N;st) = at log(N). (M
(m)
t ;a
(m)
t )
is a sector speci￿c shock that will evolve according to a Markov process. Note that for
￿ > 1, F has an upper bound given by Mt, which given that we are modelling short-run
production functions at the establishment or plant level, may be appropriate. We assume
that productivity shocks are not too bad (dropping sector superscripts):
at+1=at > ￿￿ (10)
with probability one (for example, with a log production function, this requires only
that productivity does not fall at a rate equal to turnover; since the latter is typically
estimated in the region of 30% on an annual basis, this is a mild restriction). We also
assume henceforth that workers have per-period utility functions of the constant relative
risk aversion family with coe¢ cient ￿ > 1 described by u(c) = c1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿).9 Assume
￿￿ > 1:
Under the hiring assumption, we also have that the marginal product of labour equals
atN￿￿
t , so that using (8),
Nt = a
1
￿
t w
￿ 1
￿
t : (11)
Substituting Nt = 1 we ￿nd that the spot wage is w￿
t0 = at:
8We also need the problem faced by the ￿rm to be concave; concave production and utility functions
are not su¢ cient to guarantee this.
9For ￿ = 1, set u(c) = log(c); all results go through.
92.1.2 No uncertainty
First we deal with the case of no uncertainty (so that all sectoral productivity sequences
are known at date 1 before contracts are entered into). In this case, we show that the wage
will always be kept as slow as possible subject to it never falling below the spot wage.
With downward real rigidity this would imply that the equilibrium satis￿es w(ht) =
maxt0￿t w￿
st0.
We can demonstrate a frontloading result. The following lemma establishes a very
useful fact if the model is deterministic: provided the downward constraint is not too weak
(for example, with nominal rigidity, provided in￿ ation is not too large), then wages will
fall between any two dates by the maximum allowed by the downward constraint unless
the participation constraint at the later date binds (we establish this for the case where
the constraint (4) is ignored).
The intuition is as follows: if wages next period are not up against the downward
constraint, then frontloading them by cutting next period￿ s wage a small amount and
simultaneously increasing the current wage to compensate workers does not violate any
downward constraints. If in addition next period￿ s participation constraint is not binding
then these too will be satis￿ed at all dates. This will increase pro￿ts however. The reason
is that because there is turnover￿ a number of the current workforce will be separated
before next period￿ to compensate workers the current wage does not have to be increased
too much as they discount the future wage by the probability of separation, in addition
to ￿. The ￿rm, however, puts greater weight on wages next period because it will have to
pay them to replacement workers (new hires) as well as to the surviving incumbents. Thus
the cut in future wages is valued more highly by the ￿rm and pro￿ts rise. The argument
works so long as (a) wages are not falling too quickly, as then risk-averse workers will need
additional compensation now for the steeper wage path, and (b) ￿rms are hiring in new
workers. Thus the downward constraint must not have b(ht) too small, and also negative
productivity shocks should not be too severe so that ￿rms want to hire some workers each
period, a condition we had already assumed in order to solve the model.
Lemma 4 Suppose there is no uncertainty. There exists a b < 1, such that if b(ht+1) > b;
all t, then the following must hold: If in a solution to Problem DWR￿the downward rigidity
constraint does not bind between t and t+1 then the participation constraint binds at t+1.
Proof. We use time subscripts rather than history dependent functions as there is
10no uncertainty. Suppose to the contrary of the claim wt > btwt￿1 but the participation
constraint does not bind at t + 1: Starting from the optimal contract, consider reshu› ing
wages between t and t + 1 as follows: decrease the wage at t + 1 by a small amount
￿wt+1 > 0 so that worker utility falls by ￿ > 0; and increase the wage at t by ￿wt so
that utility rises by x; and so as to leave the worker indi⁄erent; do not change the contract
otherwise. This implies that
￿￿￿￿ + x = 0 (12)
(where u0 (wt+1)￿wt+1 ’ ￿ and u0 (wt)￿wt ’ x). This frontloading satis￿es all par-
ticipation constraints: worker utility falls at t + 1 but the constraint was initially slack
by hypothesis, and so from this point on constraints are satis￿ed; similarly, participation
constraints are also satis￿ed both at t and earlier because utility is held constant over the
two periods. A su¢ ciently small change also satis￿es the downward rigidity constraint
because at t + 1 it was slack, while at t, wt + ￿wt > w(ht) ￿ btwt￿1; and at t + 2;
wt+1￿￿wt+1 < wt+1 ￿ wt+2=bt+2. We write ￿(ut;at) as the static pro￿t function at pro-
ductivity level at (we can suppress Mt which only shifts pro￿ts up or down; see (32) below
for the explicit function) when workers receive a current-period utility of ut (= u(wt)),
and N (ut;at) for the corresponding optimal labour demand. Because we are ignoring the
constraint (4), the optimal contract must generate pro￿ts of ￿(ut;at) at t (the choice of Nt
does not a⁄ect the other constraints, so Nt must be chosen to maximise current pro￿ts at
the contract wage). The change in pro￿ts (viewed from ht) arising from the frontloading
is
￿P ’ ￿￿0(ut+1;at+1)￿ ￿ ￿0(ut;at)x (13)
De￿ne " := min2￿t￿T[￿￿￿at+1=at ￿ 1], where, by (10), " > 0; so that
￿￿￿at+1=at ￿ 1 + ": (14)
From Hotelling￿ s Lemma (converting wages to utilities), ￿0(u;a) = ￿N (u;a)=u0(w).
Thus,
￿0(ut;at+1)
￿0(ut;at)
=
N (ut;at+1)
N (ut;at)
=
a
1
￿
t+1
a
1
￿
t
￿ ￿ (1 + ")
1=￿ ; (15)
where the second equality follows from optimal labour demand N = a
1
￿w￿ 1
￿(given that
ut and hence wages are constant in the ratio), and the inequality follows from (14).
Next, ￿(￿;a) is a concave function: Consider the static problem of maximizing pro￿ts
given that workers receive utility u, so that w = ((1 ￿ ￿)u)
1=(1￿￿). Substituting from the
condition that the marginal product of labour equals the wage:
N = a
1
￿w￿ 1
￿ (16)
11yields pro￿ts of
￿(u;at) ￿ Mt +
a
1
￿
t ￿((1 ￿ ￿)u)
￿ 1￿￿
￿(1￿￿)
1 ￿ ￿
: (17)
As ￿￿ > 1, this is a strictly concave function of u.
Given that wages rise at a gross rate greater than b, then if ￿ > 1 (so utilities are
negative; a similar argument, though with some inequalities reversed, applies for ￿ < 1
and we omit it),
ut+1
ut
=
￿
wt+1
wt
￿1￿￿
< b1￿￿: (18)
Then from (32),
￿0(ut+1;at+1)
￿0(ut;at+1)
=
￿
ut+1
ut
￿
￿
￿￿￿1
￿(1￿￿)
￿
> b(
￿￿￿1
￿ ); (19)
where the inequality follows from (18). Substituting (12) into (13) yields
￿P ’ ￿￿0(ut+1;at+1)￿ ￿ ￿0(ut;at)x
= ￿￿￿0(ut;at)
￿
￿0(ut+1;at+1)
￿0(ut;at)
￿ ￿
￿
> ￿￿￿0(ut;at)
￿
￿ (1 + ")
1=￿ b(
￿￿￿1
￿ ) ￿ ￿
￿
where the inequality follows from (15) and (19). Thus, provided b ￿ (1 + ")
￿ 1
￿￿￿1 ; ￿P >
0. As the initial contract was assumed optimal, this is a contradiction. Given ￿￿ > 1,
(1 + ")
￿ 1
￿￿￿1 < 1. Hence setting b = (1 + ")
￿ 1
￿￿￿1 ; the assertion of the lemma follows.
We can now show that wages rising by the minimum given by the downward con-
straint, unless this takes wages below the spot wage in which case the wage is set to the
latter, constitutes an equilibrium. We use a ￿ to denote equilibrium values.
Proposition 5 Suppose there is no uncertainty. Then there is a symmetric equilibrium
in which in each sector m, w￿m
t+1 = maxfb(ht+1)w￿m
t ;am
t+1g; w￿m
1 = am
1 :
Proof. Suppose all other ￿rms follow the putative equilibrium strategy and hire so
that they are on their labour demand curves (MPL =wage) (this de￿nes (￿t)
T
t=1 from (5))
and consider the optimal strategy of a potential deviant ￿rm ignoring constraint (4), i.e.,
a solution to Problem DWR￿(which exists by standard arguments) in sector m. Again we
drop sector superscripts and write btfor b(ht). (i) If at T; wT < w￿
T; then if w￿
T = aT, there
is full employment and so to satisfy the participation constraint a wage wT ￿ w￿
T must be
paid (see the remark below Lemma 3), so the participation constraint would be violated
by the deviation strategy and it would be infeasible; on the other hand, if w￿
T < aT,
12then at t ￿ 1, w￿
T￿1 = w￿
T=bT by de￿nition of the equilibrium strategy, and wT < w￿
T
plus downward rigidity implies wT￿1 ￿ wT=bT < w￿
T=bT, so the deviation contract o⁄ers
less discounted utility at T ￿ 1: Again, if the participation constraint binds at T ￿ 1 for
the equilibrium contract, the participation constraint would be violated for the deviant,
and if it does not bind, we can extend the argument back to T ￿ 2; etc. As soon as
the participation constraint binds (it must bind at t = 1), we will get a contradiction.
(ii) If at T; wT > w￿
T; then the participation constraint is slack for the deviant contract
and so by Lemma 4, wT￿1 = wT=bT and as w￿
T ￿ bTw￿
T￿1, wT￿1 > w￿
T￿1. If at T ￿ 1
the participation constraint binds for the deviant contract, it would be violated for the
equilibrium contract, which is impossible. Thus it cannot bind at T ￿ 1, and we can
work backwards to the point where it last binds for the deviant (it must bind at least at
t = 1 as otherwise cutting w1 would improve pro￿ts without violating any constraint), at
which point again the deviant strategy o⁄ers higher discounted utility, a contradiction.
We conclude that wT = w￿
T. By similar arguments we can show wT￿1 = w￿
T￿1; and work
backward to establish equality of the two contracts. Thus deviation is not pro￿table.
Finally, since the optimal response to the putative equilibrium contract ignoring the
constraint (4) is to adhere to the equilibrium contract, it follows that the same is true
when (4) is imposed as it is satis￿ed in the putative equilibrium from (11) and (10).
2.1.3 Uncertainty.
The above arguments do not generalise to the case of uncertainty. Lemma 4 may fail as the
frontloading of the wage contract between periods t and t+1 may now a⁄ect future wages
in other possible states￿ the wage at t is increased, so if the downward constraint binds
in some other state at t + 1 this will imply the wage increases in that state, which may
be costly. However, we can show that if T = 2 this problem cannot arise. For simplicity
assume b(h2) = 1 all h2 (downward real rigidity).
Proposition 6 If T = 2; and b(h2) = 1 all h2, there is a symmetric equilibrium in which
w￿
t = maxt0￿t w￿
t0.
Proof. To establish this we convert the ￿rm￿ s choice variable (contract) from wages
(wt(ht))
2
t=1 to utilities (ut(ht))
2
t=1. We can formulate Problem DWRR faced by the ￿rm￿
equivalent to problem DWR except we ignore the no layo⁄ condition (4)￿ as:
max
(ut(ht))2
t=1
E
"
2 X
t=1
(￿)t￿1￿(ut(ht);at)
#
(Problem AR)
13subject to ~ Vt (ht) ￿ ￿(ht) (20)
for all positive probability ht;2 ￿ t ￿ 1, and
ut (ht￿1;s) ￿ u(ht￿1); (21)
where ~ Vt (ht) is de￿ned recursively as before by:
~ Vt (ht) = u(wt(ht)) + ￿wE
￿
￿Vt+1 (ht+1) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿t+1 j ht
￿
; (22)
with ~ V3 = 0. The maximand is strictly concave (see the proof of Lemma 4) and the
constraints are linear. The Slater condition is satis￿ed by, for all ht, ut(ht) = u(w￿(ht)+"),
for " > 0. Moreover it is straightforward but tedious to show that the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are satis￿ed at the putative equilibrium contract, hence the putative solution
solves Problem DWRR and moreover can be shown to satisfy positive hiring, and so this
must also be solution to Problem DWR which has the additional constraint (4).
For T ￿ 3 we can construct counterexamples to the putative equilibrium, but only if
there are shocks su¢ ciently bad that productivity falls in a range close to ￿: We do have
not an analytical result however.10
2.1.4 No downward constraints: b(ht) = 0 all t.
In this case it is risk-aversion which prevents wages from falling too fast, rather than
an exogenously imposed ad hoc constraint. The arguments of Snell and Thomas (2006)
can be extended to show that if the participation constraint does not bind at t + 1; the
evolution of wages between t and t + 1 satis￿es the following Euler condition:
wt+1
wt
= ￿
￿
￿￿￿1
￿
at+1
at
￿ ￿1
￿￿￿1
(23)
where ￿ ￿
￿￿w
￿f ; allowing discount factors to di⁄er so that ￿w is the discount factor for
workers and ￿f that for ￿rms. Moreover if ￿rms are constrained at t+1, then as Nt+1 = 1,
wt+1 = w￿
st+1 = at+1 (from Lemma 3). Putting these two facts together, the following can
be established:
Proposition 7 (i) If there are no downward constraints (3), in a symmetric no layo⁄
equilibrium with positive hiring, wages will satisfy
w￿
t+1 = max
(
￿
￿
￿￿￿1
￿
at+1
at
￿ ￿1
￿￿￿1
w￿
t;at+1
)
; (24)
10We simulated models with iid two-state multiplicative productivity processes up to T = 13:For exam-
ple, for ￿ = :8, we con￿rmed the putative equilibrium, provided at+1=at was at least approximately :82
with probability one.
14where w￿
1 = a1 and employment is determined by the marginal productivity condition. (ii)
A su¢ cient condition for existence of this equilibrium is
at+1
at
> ￿
1
￿￿
￿￿￿1
￿ = ￿￿
￿
￿w
￿f
￿ 1
￿
: (25)
for all (at;at+1) that occur with positive probability. (iii) Under (25) this is also an equi-
librium where layo⁄s are allowed.
For ￿w = ￿f, condition (25) is that already assumed in (10), which requires that
the maximum rate of fall of productivity should be smaller than the exogenous turnover
rate raised to the power of ￿; the condition is equivalent to ensuring that labour demand
does not fall beyond exogenous separations in the putative equilibrium, so hiring remains
positive.11 In this situation, layo⁄s are of no value to the ￿rm and they can only reduce
the value of a contract to a worker.
3 Simulations
In this section we assess to what extent the model is consistent with some relevant labour
market stylised facts. In particular we guage whether the version with downward real
rigidity (we consider full downward rigidity and a weaker version) can generate a plau-
sible degree of unemployment volatility from measured total factor productivity shocks
(using US post war aggregate unemployment and TFP data from the BLS), and whether
wage/unemployment regressions on simulated data correspond to existing results. In a
single sector, unemployment falls to zero whenever the productivity shock is not too bad.
Using the multisector model, however, in which each sector will be assumed to be subject
to an idiosyncratic productivity shock as well as an aggregate shock, we will obtain more
realistic unemployment levels because it is less likely that all labour markets will simul-
taneously clear; moreover when the aggregate productivity shock is positive, there will be
more sectors with low unemployment and consequently aggregate employment is likely to
be lower.
Given knowledge of the model￿ s parameters, given an initial time period where there
was full employment and given a TFP series it is possible to generate the sectoral ￿real
wage￿series that would be predicted by versions of our theory. We can only assert that
11For a range of productivity falls above this maximum rate, outcomes di⁄er from spot outcomes: starting
from full employment in some state at, we need the wage to fall by less than the spot wage. Thus we need,
using wt = at; from (23), wt+1 = ￿
￿
￿￿￿1
￿
at+1
at
￿ ￿1
￿￿￿1 at > at+1 which can be rewritten as
at+1
at < ￿
1
￿ :
15this is an equilibrium if there is no uncertainty, so each sectoral sequence is perfectly an-
ticipated, although as noted above, we conjecture that this is also an equilibrium with
uncertainty provided shocks are not too negative. It is then possible to derive the corre-
sponding implications for unemployment (rates), and also the relationship between real
wages and unemployment.
In accordance with the theory developed earlier,we generate for each sector separate
predicted wage and unemployment series, using simulated productivity sequences as devi-
ations around measured TFP data for the U.S. economy, 1949-2001, and then aggregate
(we start simulations at full employment and spot wages in 1949, allowing 6 years for
unemployment to develop in each sector).
We examine two distinct relationships between real wages and unemployment over
the business cycle. First, studies of real wage cyclicality have mainly looked at how wages
respond to contemporaneous unemployment movements. While there is a huge literature
on this, a very rough summary would be that wages are roughly acyclical, or mildly
procyclical, with panel studies tending to suggest the latter. For example, using the PSID
for men over the period of 1968-69 to 86-87, Solon, Barsky, and Parker (Feb 1994) found
that a one percentage point reduction in the unemployment rate leads to a rise in the real
wage rate of 1.4 percent. Similar estimates are found in Shin (Oct 1994) and Devereux
(Jul 2001). From our simulations, we can regress real wage changes on unemployment to
replicate the typical regression undertaken in the panel studies.
Most studies which use longitudinal data of real wage cyclicality have, following Bils
(1985), estimated the following:
￿lnwit = ￿￿Ut + ￿t + ￿0Xit + "it; (26)
where ￿lnwit is the di⁄erence between the natural logarithm of worker i￿ s real wage rate
in year t and his log real wage in year t ￿ 1, ￿Ut is the year-to-year change in the unem-
ployment rate, and Xit is a vector containing an intercept and individual characteristics.
The equation includes also a time trend ￿t.
The second common regression relates wage levels to two lagged measures of unem-
ployment in addition to contemporaneous unemployment. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991)
test di⁄erent versions of a contracting model, which leads to a di⁄erent regression equa-
tion. Their general model can be expressed as follows: the natural log of the real wage for
worker j at time ￿ + t for a worker who started the job at time ￿ satis￿es:
lnwj;￿+t = ￿1Xj;￿+t + ￿2C(￿;t) + "j;￿+t (27)
16where Xj;￿+t is a vector of individual variables, ￿1 is the vector of coe¢ cients on these
variables, "j;￿+t is an error term, and ￿2 is the coe¢ cient on the business cycle (i.e.,
unemployment) variable, with the 3 possibilities for the business cycle variable C(￿;t)
being:
C(￿;t) =
8
> <
> :
U￿+t spot market model
U￿ fully binding contract
minfU￿+k;k = 0;1;:::;tg non-binding on worker
where the unemployment rate is denoted by U; with U￿ the rate prevailing at the start of
the job and U￿+t the rate at time ￿ + t where t denotes tenure with the employer. They
test these three models against each other on U.S. data (PSID/Current Population Survey
(CPS)). The results are striking. In some speci￿cations12 in which all three variables are
included, the coe¢ cient on the minimum unemployment rate is the only correctly signed
(i.e., negative) signi￿cant one (PSID, no ￿xed e⁄ects), and in all speci￿cations it is much
larger than the other coe¢ cients, implying that a 1% drop in the minimum unemployment
rate (e.g., from 4% to 3%) leads to an increase in current wages of between 3% and 8%.
Several recent empirical studies have largely con￿rmed the robustness of Beaudry and
DiNardo￿ s main empirical ￿ndings over di⁄erent periods and using di⁄erent datasets, that
the minimum rate of unemployment since hiring is a statistically important determinant
of the current wage of an individual (McDonald and Worswick 1999, Grant 2003, Shin and
Shin 2007, Devereux and Hart 2005). Both Grant (2003), and Devereux and Hart (2005),
however, ￿nd more of a role for the current unemployment rate than did Beaudry and
DiNardo. Grant (2003) extends Beaudry and DiNardo￿ s analysis (using six cohorts from
the National Longitudinal Surveys) to cover the time period 1966 to 1998. He ￿nds that
the signi￿cance and importance of minu is broadly robust to the addition of a number of
extra variables.
We ran both regression equations (26) and (27) on our 47 years of simulated data.
Since all workers have identical productivity in our model, there are no distinguishing
individual characteristics. For (27), we included all three unemployment measures simul-
taneously, and started the regression in 1968, to allow workers to build up a su¢ cient
history (i.e., the number of workers of each entry vintage in a ￿rm declines with tenure
due to the exogenous turnover).
To implement our simulations we need to calibrate ￿, the parameter governing the
curvature of the production function. We consider di⁄erent values: A value of 1.4 trans-
lates to a short-run elasticity of demand for labour of approximately -0.7. Estevªo and
Wilson (1998) analyzing BLS manufacturing data for a similar period that we study, found
12See Table 2 of their paper.
17a short-run demand elasticity ranging between close to zero and -0.71 with aggregate data,
and of between -0.5 and -0.89 at the 4-digit industry level for manufacturing.13 A lower
value for ￿ will magnify ￿ uctuations in sectoral unemployment (e.g., if ￿ was calibrated
to the labour share in income, assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function involving
capital). We also need to specify the productivity process in each sector. We suppose that
in each sector m, am
t equals actual TFP (as measured by the BLS for the U.S. economy)
times an idiosyncratic component which is modelled as an autoregressive (1) process with
persistence of 0.9 and mean 1. We ￿nd the variance of this process to matter to our results
(although the persistence does not appear to be signi￿cant), so we report di⁄erent levels:
we report ￿, the standard deviation of the growth rate in each sector. We also need to
calibrate ￿;the exogenous staying rate, in order to run the Beaudry-DiNardo regression
(as this determines the numbers of each entry cohort within each ￿rm). We set ￿ = 0:7;
corresponding to an annual turnover rate of 30%. We run the simulations for 100 sectors,
and report mean values of coe¢ cients based on 100 simulations. (The reported coe¢ cients
are almost always signi￿cant in the simulated regressions.) For most of the simulations
we assume full downward rigidity, b(ht) = 1, but we also allow a 3 and 5% fall per annum,
i.e., b(ht) = :97=:95.
The other question we look at is whether the model can generate su¢ cient degrees
of unemployment variability from the underlying process. Since the latter is based on
measured TFP, with a large number of sectors the aggregate TFP for our model economy
has a similar variability to the measured series (its growth rate has a standard deviation
over the sample of 2.3% when ￿ = 13% compared with 1.7% for the underlying TFP
series). Thus, we report the variability of simulated aggregate unemployment.
Unemployment has a standard deviation of 1.6% over our sample period. In most
of our simulations, the model produces more variability. The fairly acyclic nature of the
real wage should yield a wage cyclicality coe¢ cient (￿ in (26)) close to zero, although as
discussed, recent longitudinal studies would suggest a value closer to 1. The coe¢ cients
on C(￿;t) in (27), presented in the ￿nal three columns of the table, are often, in exist-
ing studies, incorrectly signed (i.e., positive) except for that on minimum unemployment.
What we ￿nd is that all the reported calibrations produce negative coe¢ cients on unem-
ployment in (26), though somewhat smaller than that in recent studies. The coe¢ cients in
(27) appear, however, to depend on the degree of sectoral productivity variability. If this
is su¢ ciently high, at ￿ = 17% in the table, the coe¢ cient on minimum unemployment
is consistently negative,14 whereas the other two coe¢ cients are incorrectly signed. This
13Hamermesh (1993) reports that a lower elasticity, around ￿0:3, is typical.
14The reader might be puzzled as to how this is possible given that all workers are paid the same. The
18is what Beaudry and DiNardo found in some of their speci￿cations, although the size of
the minimum unemployment coe¢ cient is lower than theirs. However, when the variance
of the shocks is reduced, we ￿nd that the signs reverse. (This is a robust ￿nding across
alternative parameterisations).
Model Std Dev Wage Cycl. Min Unem. Start Unem. Curr. Unem.
of Unem Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient
￿ = 1:8; ￿ = 13% 3.8% -0.3 -0.02 1.60 1.69
￿ = 1:8; ￿ = 17% 4.8% -0.27 -0.59 2.20 1.56
￿ = 1:8; ￿ = 5% 1.5% -0.50 2.84 -0.14 -2.14
￿ = 1:2; ￿ = 17% 6.2% -0.13 -0.76 1.39 1.31
￿ = 0:7; ￿ = 3% 2.0% -0.24 0.75 -0.44 -1.44
￿ = 1:8;￿ = 17%15 1.8% -0.50 -0.20 0.7 -0.83
￿ = 1:8;￿ = 22%16 1.7% -0.41 -1.01 0.43 -0.22
￿ = 1:8;￿ = 16%17 1.3% -0.37 -0.27 1.40 1.89
To get predictions that match better all the stylised facts simultaneously, we found
it necessary to relax full downward rigidity, and instead allow respectively 3% and 5%
p.a. falls (see the penultimate two rows in the table).18 As wages can fall, this lessens the
amount of unemployment that can develop in a sector, and with it, reduces the variability
overall of unemployment closer to the observed magnitude. Finally, in the bottom row,
we report results from downward nominal rigidity, but where we have put a maximum fall
in real wages of 5% . Again this produces good results, although the coe¢ cient on current
unemployment in (27) is positive and large, whereas recent results suggest that a negative
coe¢ cient is more resonable.
To conclude, while the model is capable of reproducing, to an extent, empirically
established relationships between wages and unemployment, it requires a high degree vari-
ability of sectoral shocks, and such that aggregate unemployment is actually more variable
than is empirically plausible unless real wages can fall.
answer is that there is variabilty across sectors both of wages and also of proportions employed in each
cohort, since sectoral employment histories di⁄er. This is true even of wages at a ￿xed date: running (27)
at a single date produces similar results; this is consistent with Grant (2003), who ￿nds that the minimum
unemployment term is robust to the inclusion of time dummies.
15For b(ht) = 0:97:
16b(ht) = 0:95:
17b(ht) = max[pt￿1=pt;0:95]:
18Elsby (2005) charts the distribution of real wage changes in the PSID over a relatively low in￿ ation
period (so surprise in￿ ation is less likely to lead to unanticipated real wage falls), 1983-1992; real wage
falls rarely exceed about 6%, with a spike around 2-4%. Likewise Christophides and Stengos (Apr 2003)
￿nd from Canadian wage contract data in the unionized sector that most real wage reductions in the 1990s
were of the order of 1-2%.
194 Concluding Comments
This paper has analysed a model with downward rigidities in which ￿rms cannot pay
discriminate based on year of entry to a ￿rm. We solved for the dynamics of wages and
unemployment under conditions of downward wage rigidity, where forward looking ￿rms
take into account these constraints. We found that the equilibrium could be solved for
under conditions of certainty. Using simulated productivity data based on the post-war
US economy, we analysed the ability of the model to match certain stylised labour market
facts, and found that it was able to generate su¢ cient variability of unemployment, but
could only match other stylised facts under restricted conditions.
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